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 NOTE 
Class Warfare: The Eighth Circuit Clamps 
Down on Consumer Class Actions Under 
Rule 23(b)(3) 
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2013) 
CALEB WAGNER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The class action has proven to be one of the most successful tools in the 
American justice system for consumers to vindicate their rights.  When cor-
porations receive windfalls through misconduct that causes small losses to 
large groups of people, class actions are often the only effective method for 
the losses to be recovered.  As a result, class litigation plays an important part 
in the civil justice system’s goals of deterring harmful behavior and compen-
sating victims.1 
Much maligned by the business lobby, this important vehicle for justice 
is now under attack in legislatures and in the courts.  In recent years, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has taken steps to constrain the use of class 
actions by consumers and employees.2  Following their example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit now appears poised to impose 
severe restrictions on the use of the device by viewing trial courts’ grants of 
class certification with a heavy dose of skepticism.3 
This Note will discuss a lawsuit, brought on behalf of North Dakota in-
surance policyholders, which challenged a scheme by their insurance compa-
ny to reduce payments on medical claims.  Though the trial court allowed the 
suit to proceed as a class action, the Eighth Circuit found this decision im-
proper and ruled that the class must be decertified.4  In doing so, the Eighth 
Circuit did not merely apply the recent Supreme Court rulings disfavoring 
class actions but also extended them.  This Note will argue that these prece-
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 1. JOCELYN BOGDAN, CENTER FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, CUTTING CLASSES: 
THE SLOW DEMISE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN AMERICA 1 (2013). 
 2. See infra Part III.B. 
 3. Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 780 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 4. Id. at 780. 
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dents should instead be narrowly construed so that the goals of class litigation 
may be achieved. 
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and claims that gave rise to the 
dispute in Halvorson.  Part III discusses the requirements for certifying a 
class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as 
recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit interpreting the 
requirements for class certification.  Part IV discusses the Eighth Circuit’s 
analysis and resolution of the issues presented by the case.  Finally, Part V of 
this Note analyzes the Eighth Circuit’s decision and critiques its holding on 
various grounds. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In December 2008, Shelene and Gale Halvorson filed suit against Auto-
Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) and its subsidiary, Owners In-
surance Company, alleging breach of contract and bad faith.5  The suit arose 
out of a 2005 car accident after which Shelene Halvorson submitted her med-
ical bills to Auto-Owners under her policy’s personal injury protection (PIP) 
provision.6  Auto-Owners failed to pay $88.01 of the bill, claiming that it 
exceeded the customary amount for the services she received.7  The Halvor-
sons sued for full payment and sought class action certification to pursue 
redress on behalf of similarly situated policyholders.8 
According to the Halvorsons, Auto-Owners shortchanged them by an 
improper third-party review process.9  Their policy stated that Auto-Owners 
was required to pay all “reasonable charges incurred” for medical treatment 
resulting from an automobile accident.10  To determine whether or not an 
incurred charge was reasonable, Auto-Owners employed third-party bill re-
viewers, who reduced the amount paid on claims by making “reasonable and 
customary” reductions based on a statistical model they maintained.11 
This statistical model was created by determining the cost of various 
medical services charged by providers in a given geographic area and arrang-
ing these costs based on percentiles.12 For example, a fifty-fifth percentile 
assignment reflects the amount at or under which fifty-five percent of doctors 
would charge for the service in the pertinent geographic area.13  Auto-Owners 
determined that it would pay up to the eightieth percentile, essentially con-
cluding that the eightieth percentile reflected their contractual obligation to 
 
 5. 27-5 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. INS. BAD FAITH 1 (2013). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 775. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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pay for reasonable charges incurred.14  Thus, when bills were submitted to 
Auto-Owners, the bill reviewers would recommend to the claims adjustors 
that the amount of the claim paid be reduced so that it would not exceed the 
eightieth percentile.15 
Auto-Owners argued that its claims adjustors had broad discretion to re-
ject these recommendations.16  The Halvorsons claimed, however, that this 
discretion was rarely exercised.17  They argued, in effect, that Auto-Owners 
had a corporate policy of denying payment on any amount that exceeded the 
eightieth percentile and that this failure amounted to a breach of good faith in 
fulfilling their contractual duties.18 
The Halvorsons sought to represent a class of North Dakota and Minne-
sota policyholders who had their claims payments reduced due to a           
percentile-based review.19  The Halvorsons initially filed suit in Arizona state 
court, but Auto-Owners had the case removed to federal court and trans-
ferred to the District of North Dakota.20  On February 23, 2012 the district 
court entered an order denying class certification to the Minnesota policy-
holders but granting class certification to policyholders in North Dakota.21  
The court held that Minnesota law required all no-fault claims under $10,000 
to be arbitrated, and as a result, the Minnesota class could not be main-
tained.22  The court ruled, however, that the class of North Dakota policy-
holders could go forward.  It stated that “because the evidence in this case 
reflects that the bill review recommendations were almost always followed, 
the question of whether that process was unfair is ripe for resolution on a 
class-wide basis.” 23 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by certifying the class.24  The court found that the class could not be 
maintained because some of the members did not have standing to sue and 
because common questions did not predominate over individualized ones.25  
As a result, the requirements for class certification were not met.26  The court 
held that because the answer to the question of reasonableness would not 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. MEALEY’S, supra note 5 at ¶ 7. 
 20. Id. at ¶ ¶ 5, 7. 
 21. Halverson, 718 F.3d at 713. 
 22. Id. at 777. 
 23. Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co, No, 3:09-cv-00075-RRR-KKK at *18 
(D.N.D. Feb 23, 2012). 
 24. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 780. 
 25. Id. at 779-80. 
 26. Id. at 780. 
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produce a uniform answer throughout the class, a class action was not the 
proper form of adjudication.27 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will first discuss the requirements for class certification under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Next, this Part will detail 
some recent developments in class certification law that have resulted from 
recent decisions by the Supreme Court.  Finally, this Part will discuss the 
Eighth Circuit’s view on class certification prior to its ruling in Halvorson. 
A.  Requirements of Rule 23 
Likely the most fiercely contested decision type in civil litigation is the 
decision by a court to grant or deny a motion for class certification.  This 
seemingly innocuous pretrial decision often determines whether the litigation 
will continue at all, and thus, it often amounts to a multi-million dollar ques-
tion.  As one court stated, the certification decision is the “defining moment” 
in a class action. 28 A denial of certification, in many cases, amounts to a 
“death knell” for the plaintiffs, closing their only feasible avenue for re-
dress.29  A court’s decision to certify a class, on the other hand, puts enor-
mous pressure on a defendant to settle the case, lest they risk ruinous liability 
in front of a jury.30  Though the court’s decision on certification has little 
bearing on the underlying merits of the claim, it is nonetheless often determi-
native of the outcome.31 
The reasons for the outsized importance of this seemingly obscure civil 
procedure device stem from the ubiquity of “negative value” class actions.32  
A negative value claim is a claim that, without the aid of an aggregating 
mechanism like a class action, is too small to be brought.33  Essentially, the 
costs of bringing the claim exceed the amount that could be recovered.34  A 
paradigmatic example of such a situation would be a class of 500,000 con-
sumers suing a company for $50 each.  If the court denies the consumers’ 
request to proceed as a class, the litigation effectively comes to an end be-
cause the cost for each individual to bring a claim would greatly exceed $50.  
However, if the claims are aggregated, the amount at stake in the suit would 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 164. 
 31. Id. at 167. 
 32. Mullenix, Linda S., Complex Litigation: Negative Value Suits, 26 NAT’L L.J. 
11 (2004). 
 33. Id.; Univ. of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 466, available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2278312. 
 34. Id. 
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be $25 million, easily enough money to retain representation and present 
proof.  Thus, in negative value class actions, a decision to deny class certifi-
cation usually determines whether the litigation will continue in any form and 
is therefore essentially dispositive of the outcome.35 
Despite its importance in class action litigation, the motion for certifica-
tion has little to do with the merits of the claims being made.36  Instead, it 
asks whether the plaintiffs have met the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a)-
(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are concerned with deter-
mining whether the group of plaintiffs is large enough, cohesive enough, and 
sufficiently represented to make class adjudication appropriate.37  To qualify 
as a class, the plaintiffs must meet the four requirements of Rule 23(a), collo-
quially referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation.38  They must then fit within one of the three types of class 
actions described in Rule 23(b).39 
The first requirement of Rule 23(a), numerosity, asks whether the class 
is so large that use of the joinder device to combine the claims would be im-
practicable.40  Generally, courts presume that classes of more than forty 
members fulfill this requirement,41 though there are exceptions.42  The second 
requirement, commonality, asks if there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class.43  Traditionally, courts saw this requirement as being easily met 
by the plaintiffs.44  However, in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions, 
courts have begun to be much more exacting.45  The third requirement, typi-
cality, queries whether “the claims or defenses of the representative parties 
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”46  This requirement con-
cerns the capacity of the named class representatives to represent the interests 
of unnamed and absent class members.47  As one court stated, “The repre-
sentative party’s interest in prosecuting his own case must simultaneously 
 
 35. Newton, 259 F.3d at 167. 
 36. However, courts are free to look to the merits if needed to assist in the reso-
lution of issues presented at certification.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b). 
 38. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 39. See infra note 54. 
 40. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 41. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 42. Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17, 21 (C.D. Cal. 1969) 
(finding that joinder was not impracticable in a class with 350 members). 
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 44. Oplchenski v. Parfums Givenchy, Inc., 254 F.R.D. 489, 495 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 45. See infra Part II.B; see also Bryant, et al. v. Southland Tube, 294 F.R.D.  
633, 647 (N.D. Ala. 2013); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 708 F.3d 704 (6th   
Cir. 2013). 
 46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 47. Prado-Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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tend to advance the interests of the absent class members.”48  The final re-
quirement under Rule 23(a), adequacy of representation, asks whether “the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”49  Courts have stated that this requirement “tends to merge” with typi-
cality because it attempts to ferret out any antagonism between the named 
representatives and the unnamed class members.50  Additionally, though, it 
seeks to ensure that the lawyers representing the plaintiff class are skilled and 
experienced enough to handle complex class action litigation.51 
If the plaintiffs meet the requirements under Rule 23(a), they must then 
establish that their class fits into one of the provisions of Rule 23(b) in order 
to be certified.52  Rule 23(b)(1) permits two types of classes: one where in-
consistent judgments with respect to individual members would establish 
incompatible standards for the party opposing the class53 and one where there 
is a “limited fund” of recovery, such that “adjudications with respect to indi-
vidual class members, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the inter-
ests of the other members that are not parties to the individual adjudica-
tions.”54  Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class to be maintained if “the party oppos-
ing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the 
class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is ap-
propriate respecting the class as a whole.”55  Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) allows a 
class action to be maintained if “the court finds that the questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”56 
Rule 23(b)(3) actions are the most wide-ranging and likely the most 
controversial type of class action. They differ from (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes 
in several respects.  Perhaps the foremost distinguishing characteristic is that, 
unlike the more traditional (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, (b)(3) classes can recover 
monetary damages that are not merely incidental to injunctive relief.57  Rule 
 
 48. Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 50. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982). 
 51. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 53. See Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F.Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (de-
termining the rights of all debenture holders to convert their holdings into common 
stock in a corporation). 
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).  For an example of a “limited fund” class action,  
see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (finding that the class was         
not suitable for limited fund treatment because the defendant’s funds were only   
limited by artifice). 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).  A typical example of a “(b)(2)” class action is a 
civil rights suit seeking injunctive relief. 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 57. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 305 (West, 5th ed. 2010). 
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23 was amended in 1966 to make judgments on (b)(3) classes binding on all 
class members, even those absent from the litigation.58  As a result, unlike 
(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, all members of a (b)(3) class must receive notice of 
the nature of the action and be given the opportunity to opt out so that they 
are not bound by the judgment and may pursue their own action separately.59 
Despite these additional requirements, (b)(3) class actions have proven 
to be a potent tool for consumers to assert their rights, especially against 
powerful defendants who hold significant structural advantages in determin-
ing the outcome of the dispute.  Most class action cases asserting a claim for 
damages alleging corporate misconduct are certified under Rule 23(b)(3).60  
This includes most “negative value” class actions, including the one brought 
by the Halvorsons in the instant case. 
For the plaintiffs to prevail on a motion for certification under Rule 
23(b)(3), they must demonstrate the existence of superiority and predomi-
nance, in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a).61  The superi-
ority requirement asks whether the class action is the best available method   
for resolving the controversy.62  A significant consideration for the courts in 
evaluating superiority is whether the claims are too small to be litigated   
individually.63  To meet the predominance requirement, the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that common questions of law or fact predominate over individ-
ual issues.64 
Since the inception of the modern Rule 23(b)(3) in 1966, courts have 
traditionally taken a fairly permissive view of the predominance inquiry.65  In 
one early case, the Supreme Court suggested that courts should not delve into 
the merits to resolve the question.66  As a result, many lower courts were will-
ing to credit plaintiffs’ theories of predominance.67  However, the law is rap-
 
 58. Susan T. Spence, Looking Back . . . in a Collective Way: A Short History of 
Class Action Law, 11-Aug BUS. L. TODAY 21, 23 (2002). 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
 60. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 57, at 307. 
 61. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 62. Id. 
 63. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 57, at 307. 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 65. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Blackie v. Bar-    
rack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., 323 F.3d 32 (1st 
Cir. 2003). 
 66. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (stating that “noth-
ing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to 
conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it 
may be maintained as a class action”). 
 67. See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004); Williams v. 
Chartwell Fin. Servs., 204 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2000); Kesler v. Ikea U.S., Inc., 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97555 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008). 
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idly shifting away from this permissive view as the Supreme Court has begun 
to disfavor the use of class actions.68 
B.  The Supreme Court and Class Action Certification 
While the law affecting class actions, including the predominance re-
quirement, is currently in flux, it is clear that the current Supreme Court takes 
a much more restrictive view of the mechanism than it has in the past.69  No-
tably, it has expressed a preference for arbitration, holding in AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws of uncon-
scionability that allowed consumers to evade arbitration clauses in adhesive 
contracts.70  As a result, many corporations can now avoid class actions alto-
gether by simply including an arbitration clause in their form contracts.71  The 
Court extended and clarified its Concepcion ruling in American Express Co. 
v. Italian Colors Restaurant,72 where it held that arbitration clauses will be 
strictly enforced, even if they deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to “effective-
ly vindicate” their rights.73  Thus, even in “negative value” situations, where 
the claim could not rationally be asserted without a class action, arbitration 
will still be enforced. 
While Concepcion and Italian Colors are potentially devastating for 
plaintiffs and for the effective enforcement of the nation’s consumer protec-
tion, antitrust, and securities laws, they do not deal with Rule 23 on its own 
terms.  This is not true of the Court’s ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, which significantly heightened the commonality requirement under 
Rule 23(a).74  The Court’s ruling in Dukes, which emanated from a putative 
nationwide gender discrimination class action, held that the plaintiffs must 
establish not merely that they were subjected to the same violation of law but 
also that they suffered substantially the same injury.75  The Court held that for 
 
 68. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, & Declining 
Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 446 (2013). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 71. Amanda Frost, Academic Highlight: Gilles and Friedman on the Future of 
Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (Sep. 5, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2012/09/academic-highlight-gilles-and-friedman-on-the-future-of-class-actions/. 
 72. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 73. David Garcia, Opinion Analysis: A Class Action Waiver in an Arbitration 
Agreement Will Be Strictly Enforced Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 21, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/ 
opinion-analysis-a-class-action-waiver-in-an-arbitration-agreement-will-be-strictly-
enforced-under-the-federal-arbitration-act/. 
 74. Spencer, supra note 68, at 463. 
 75. Walmart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).  The putative 
class contained over 500,000 wo-men who claimed that Wal-Mart discriminated 
against them in employment and promotion decisions in violation of Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Wal-Mart and Work-
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the commonality requirement to be met, there must be a common contention 
amongst the members of the class that is capable of resolving the dispute on a 
classwide basis for all members.76  This means that “determination of [the 
common question’s] truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”77  Essentially, this is very 
similar to the analysis courts have used to resolve the question of predomi-
nance under Rule 23(b)(3).  Ostensibly, then, Dukes should not alter the way 
courts analyze (b)(3) classes because the opinion in essence imported the 
predominance inquiry into the commonality question.  However, in Dukes’ 
aftermath, many courts have adopted more stringent requirements for plain-
tiffs to establish predominance.78 
The Supreme Court further restricted the certification of class actions in 
Comcast v. Behrend, which involved a proposed (b)(3) class, in which it held 
that courts must consider the merits of the claims if the merits pertain to the 
ability of the plaintiffs to establish damages on a class-wide basis.79  In its 
decision the Court held that the plaintiffs’ damages model could not establish 
the element of predominance because the model failed to match up with their 
only remaining viable theory of liability.80  Though it is not yet clear how far-
reaching the effects of Behrend will be, courts denying class certification 
have already cited the case on numerous occasions.81 
C.  The Eighth Circuit’s View on Class Actions 
Taken together, these cases indicate a sea change in the way federal 
courts view class actions.82  Following the lead of the Supreme Court, lower 
federal courts have begun to view the device with skepticism and hostility.  
This trend has become apparent in the Eighth Circuit, which took a fairly 
 
ers’ Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 28, 2011, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/03/argument-preview-wal-mart-and-workers-
rights/. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. John Beisner & Geoffrey M. Wyatt, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: A Year of 
Substantial Influence, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-
contributions/wal-mart-stores-v-dukes-a-year-of-substantial-influence-by-john-
beisner-and-geoffrey-m-wyatt-skadden-arps-slate-meagher-flom-llp/. 
 79. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). 
 80. Sergio Campos, Opinion Analysis: No Common Ground, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Mar. 29, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-no-
common-ground/. 
 81. See, e.g., Driver v. Appleillinois, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154773 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 29, 2013) (tipped employees alleging wage theft); Bright v. Asset Ac-
ceptance, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108432 (D.N.J. Aug. 1, 2013) (alleged viola-
tion of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); Powell v. Tosh, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120448 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (nuisance action against hog farm). 
 82. See infra Parts IV and V. 
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liberal view of class certification just a few years ago in In re Zurn Pex 
Plumbing Products Liability Litigation.83 
In Zurn Pex, a class of plaintiffs alleged that the brass fittings on the 
plumbing systems manufactured by the defendants were inherently defec-
tive.84  Some members of the plaintiff class had already experienced leaks as 
a result of the alleged defect, but another group, called the “dry plaintiffs,” 
had not yet experienced leaks and sought to sue under Minnesota state war-
ranty law.85  To demonstrate that it would be simply a matter of time before 
these defects would occur, the “dry plaintiffs” relied on expert testimony.86  
Notably, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court was not required to 
perform a full Daubert inquiry at the certification stage to determine the ad-
missibility of the testimony.87  Instead, the Eighth Circuit endorsed an analy-
sis of the experts’ methods and conclusions tailored for the questions present-
ed at the certification stage.88  In doing so, the court relied on the tentative 
nature of class certification, the early stage of the evidentiary findings, and 
the argument that the policy underlying Daubert is to protect juries, not judg-
es, from unsound science.89 
Beyond the holding that Daubert hearings are not required at the certifi-
cation stage, the Eighth Circuit also broadened its approach regarding the 
standing of class members.90  Previously, the Eighth Circuit had adopted a 
restrictive approach, stating that “purchasers of an allegedly defective product 
have no legally recognizable claim where the alleged defect has not manifest-
ed itself in the product they own.”91  It had further held on another occasion 
that a plaintiff does not invoke standing to sue by “alleg[ing] that a product 
line contains a defect or that a product is at risk for manifesting this defect.”92  
Rather, the court held that “the plaintiffs must allege that their product actual-
ly exhibited the alleged defect.”93 
This restrictive view of standing for class members was largely abrogat-
ed by the Eighth Circuit in Zurn Pex.94  There, the court held that the plain-
tiffs could maintain a claim when they alleged that a product was defective, 
even if that defect had not yet caused any external damage to the plaintiffs’ 
property.95  It found that these “dry plaintiffs” were distinct from “no injury” 
plaintiffs because they alleged an inherent defect in the product, not simply a 
 
 83. Cox v. Zurn Pex, Inc., 644 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 84. Id. at 608. 
 85. Id. at 616. 
 86. Id. at 617. 
 87. Id. at 614. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 613-14. 
 90. Id. at 616-18. 
 91. Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 92. O’Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 503 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Zurn Pex, 644 F.3d at 616-19. 
 95. Id. at 616-17. 
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hypothetical future defect.96  The result of this analysis was a less strenuous 
standard for plaintiffs to bring class actions under warranty statutes. 
The court in Zurn Pex also adopted a deferential posture towards the 
district court’s finding that common questions predominated.97  Though the 
Eighth Circuit noted that there were individualized questions to be resolved, 
it was satisfied that the district court had conducted a rigorous analysis.98  As 
a result, it credited the district court’s finding on predominance.99 
While Zurn Pex required district courts to conduct a thorough review of 
plaintiffs’ claims to ensure that they complied with the requirements of Rule 
23, it created a fairly liberal standard for certifying a class.100  However, fol-
lowing the spirit of the recent Supreme Court decisions, the Eighth Circuit 
has begun to charter a new and more restrictive path in Halvorson. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In its ruling, written by Judge Smith and joined by Judges Loken and 
Benton, the Eighth Circuit held that the class of North Dakota Auto-Owner 
policyholders who submitted no-fault personal injury claims must be decerti-
fied.101  The court first discussed the nature of the Havorsons’ complaint and 
their challenge to Auto-Owners’ percentile-based review of PIP claims.102  It 
then outlined the district court’s ruling, which found that the class of North 
Dakota policyholders was to be certified.103 
The court noted that Auto-Owners challenged the district court’s opin-
ion on three grounds: that common issues did not predominate, that some of 
the class members do not have standing, and that the certification of the class 
was at odds with the decisions of the majority of other courts that considered 
similar issues.104  The court then noted that Dukes and Behrend require that 
the plaintiffs make a showing of affirmative proof that the requirements of 
Rule 23 are met.105  Since this action was filed under 23(b)(3), this meant that 
the plaintiffs were required to produce evidence that common issues predom-
inated over individualized ones.106 
The court began its analysis by considering the issue of standing.107  It 
recited Auto-Owners’ argument that some of the plaintiff class members did 
 
 96. Id. at 617. 
 97. Id. at 619. 
 98. Id. at 618-19. 
 99. Id. at 619. 
 100. See generally Zurn Pex, 644 F.3d at 617-19. 
 101. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 774, 780. 
 102. Id. at 775. 
 103. Id. at 776-77. 
 104. Id. at 777-78. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 778. 
 107. Id. 
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not have standing because they did not suffer an injury-in-fact.108  In effect, 
Auto-Owners claimed that in order to have suffered an injury, the plaintiffs 
must have submitted proof that their claim was “usual and customary” and 
that Auto-Owners failed to fully pay it.109  Otherwise, Auto-Owners argued, 
if the claim was not “usual and customary,” the plaintiff did not suffer an 
injury.110 
The court stated that a class could not be certified if it contained mem-
bers who did not have standing.111  It went on to say that standing “requires a 
showing of injury in fact to the plaintiff that is fairly traceable to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant.”112 
Regarding the instant putative class, the Eighth Circuit proceeded to 
state that individualized issues of whether a provider’s charge was “usual and 
customary” (and thus whether the discounted payment was appropriate) 
would overwhelm common issues regarding whether or not the third-party 
bill review system was reasonable.113  The court then acknowledged that the 
Eighth Circuit recently upheld class certification in Zurn Pex, a case where 
some of the plaintiffs had suffered no injury.114  The court noted that in up-
holding class certification (despite the fact that some of the plaintiffs had not 
yet suffered damages from the alleged defect), it had noted that the underly-
ing substantive law, a Minnesota warranty statute, allowed suits for latent 
defects that existed at the time of installation.115 
The court then distinguished the instant case from Zurn Pex on the basis 
that there was no similar statute that creates an injury-in-fact despite the non-
existence of damages.116  It stated that “[s]ome members [of the class] likely 
have standing, and some likely do not.”117  The court went on to say that if a 
health care provider accepted Auto-Owners’ payment at the eightieth percen-
tile as payment in full or if Auto-Owners negotiated a settlement with the 
provider without involving the plaintiff, the plaintiff had not suffered a cog-
nizable injury.118  Thus, the court held that because the putative class con-
tained members who did not suffer an injury, it could not be certified.119 
The Eighth Circuit then went on to hold that individual legal issues pre-
dominated over class-wide legal issues, meaning that the plaintiffs had failed 
to meet the requirements for a 23(b)(3) class.120  It held that the predominance 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 779. 
 112. Id. (citing Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 780. 
 120. Id. 
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requirement was not met, even though the trial court found that Auto-Owners 
employees did not have discretion in the application of the payment reduction 
mechanism.121  The court noted that a claim for breach of contract under 
North Dakota law required the plaintiff to prove the existence of a contract, 
the breach of that contract, and damages.122  The court then found that in or-
der for the plaintiffs to prevail, they would have to show that their claims for 
payment were based on “usual and customary rates.”123  Because each plain-
tiff suffered different injuries and was treated by different doctors charging 
different amounts, the court found that the inquiries were too individualized 
to permit class proceedings.124 
The court further stated that the commonality question posed by the 
Dukes majority – why was I disfavored? – could not be answered in a uni-
form manner on a class-wide basis.125  The court opined that someone at the 
eightieth percentile may not have received full payment because they were 
subjected to unreasonable treatment, whereas someone at the ninety-fifth 
percentile may not have received full payment because their claim was legit-
imately unusual and not customary.126  Thus, because the answer as to why 
individuals would be disfavored would fluctuate throughout the class, and 
because the reasonableness of any reduction in payment would have to be 
individually analyzed, the court found that a class action could not be main-
tained.127 
V.  COMMENT 
The Eighth Circuit’s ruling in the instant decision demonstrates its ea-
gerness to follow the trend set by the Supreme Court in restricting the use and 
application of Rule 23.  As one of the most conservative federal appellate 
courts in the nation128 this outcome is not unexpected.  Still, the decision in 
Halvorson is noteworthy because it demonstrates the vigor with which the 
Eighth Circuit is willing to pursue what it sees as its directive: to clamp down 
on consumer class litigation. 
 
 121. In a deposition, an officer for Auto-Owners Insurance stated that the compa-
ny’s adjustors were supposed to adhere to the recommendations of the third-party 
reviewers.  Id. at 777.  Thus, it was company policy to reduce payments over the 
eightieth percentile. 
 122. Id. at 779-80. 
 123. Id. at 780. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Andreas Broschild, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals 
More Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 172 (2011) 
(“the Seventh and Eighth Circuits are [typically regarded as] two of the most con-
servative” appellate circuits). 
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In doing so, the court erred on several fronts.  First, it failed to give the 
district court proper deference on its decision to certify the class.  Second, in 
its zeal to decertify, the Eighth Circuit actually preceded Supreme Court doc-
trine on the issue of predominance of common questions.  Finally, the court 
ignored important policy considerations weighing in favor of aggregating 
claims similar to those brought by the Halvorsons. 
A.  The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by  
Certifying the Class 
Unlike many appellate decisions that are made on a de novo basis, ap-
peals on class certification issues are reviewed for abuses of discretion, a 
much more deferential standard.129  However, the court in Halvorson gave the 
lower court’s ruling little, if any, deference, instead substituting its own 
judgment for that of the trial court.  In doing so, the court dismantled a class 
that should have been allowed to go forward under current doctrine, and set 
the stage for hyper-vigilant review of district court certification orders. 
1.  The Standing Problem Could Easily Be Cured Without             
Dismantling the Class 
The court based its ruling, in large part, on its finding that some mem-
bers of the proposed class did not have standing because they did not suffer 
an injury-in-fact.130  To support this finding, the court tersely stated that “[i]f 
a health-care provider accepted Auto-Owner’s payment at the 80th percentile 
as payment in full (or if Auto Owners settled the dispute without involving 
the plaintiff), the plaintiff was not injured.”131  Essentially, the court stated 
that even if a defendant short-changed a plaintiff’s doctor, the plaintiff did not 
lose anything unless he was billed for the difference.132  The court reasoned 
that because some of the doctors worked out the dispute with the insurance 
company without involving the plaintiff in any way, some of the policyhold-
ers who were subjected to percentile-based review did not suffer any cog-
nizable injury.133 
Though this may well be true, it does not follow that a class must be de-
certified as a result.  Instead, the court could have taken much less drastic 
 
 129. Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th         
Cir. 2010). 
 130. It is widely held doctrine that a proposed class that contains members who  
do not have standing cannot be certified.  Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600,        
604 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Denny v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263-64 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (“[N]o class may be certified that contains members lacking Article III 
standing”). 
 131. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 779. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. at 779-80. 
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measures to remedy the problem.  A more measured ruling would have re-
manded the case to the district court to redefine the class and ensure that it 
did not contain uninjured persons.134  As constituted in the instant case, the 
class was defined as: 
From December 10, 2004, through the present, all persons covered by 
Auto-Owners medpay or PIP policies issued in North Dakota, and 
their provider assignees, who (1) submitted claims for payment of 
medical expenses to Auto-Owners pursuant to an Auto-Owners auto 
policy’s PIP coverage; (2) were paid an amount less than the submit-
ted medical expenses based upon a percentile-based reduction result-
ing from Auto-Owners’ third-party bill review process during the de-
fined class period; and (3) were paid an amount less than the policy 
limits for their claims. Excluded from the class are the following: Au-
to-Owners, their officers and employees, their affiliates, any entity in 
which Auto-Owners has a controlling interest, and successors or as-
signs of any of the foregoing, and those persons who have exhausted 
the policy limits applicable to their PIP coverage.135 
To cure the problem of standing, the court could have added an addi-
tional requirement to the class definition stating that the insured plaintiff had 
been billed or had paid an outstanding amount to Auto-Owners.136  This 
would have ensured that each plaintiff in the class had suffered a bona fide 
injury.  This approach would remedy the standing problem and do so in a way 
that does not abrogate the function of the trial court, which had found that the 
instant litigation called for certification under Rule 23(b)(3). 
The Eighth Circuit spent most of its discussion of the standing issue dis-
tinguishing the case from the Zurn Pex decision, which allowed a class to be 
certified when some of the plaintiffs had not yet suffered property damage 
and thus were not truly injured.137  The court’s distinction, which turned on 
the underlying substantive law, was persuasive.  The relevant state law in 
Zurn Pex, by definition, held that members of the class who owned immi-
nently defective products had suffered an injury simply by buying these 
products.138  The court rightly noted that the North Dakota law relevant to the 
instant decision made no such allowance.139  However, by focusing on distin-
guishing the instant class from the Zurn Pex precedent, the Eighth Circuit 
failed to recognize the ease with which the standing problem could be fixed. 
 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 777. 
 136. Cf. id. at 779-80. 
 137. Id.; see Cox v. Zurn Pex, Inc., 644 F.3d 604, 617-19 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 138. Zurn Pex, 644 F.3d at 617. 
 139. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 779. 
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2.  The Class-Wide Common Questions Presented in the Litigation 
Predominated Over Individualized Inquiries 
The Eighth Circuit, in somewhat summary fashion, stated that the plain-
tiffs failed to show that common questions predominated over individual 
ones.140  The court held that the central question of the case, whether the de-
fendant failed to pay for “usual and customary” medical expenses as was their 
legal obligation,141 could not be answered on a class-wide basis.142  In so 
finding, it stated that “[m]embers of the class incurred different injuries, 
which were treated by different medical providers charging different prices 
for their services.”143  Thus, the inquiry of whether the contract was breached 
as a result of the percentile-based review process would turn on facts particu-
lar to each individual policyholder.144  The court further stated that the ques-
tion posed by the Supreme Court in Dukes145 could not be answered on a 
class-wide basis because someone at the eightieth percentile was in a signifi-
cantly different legal position than someone at the ninety-fifth percentile146. 
However, the Supreme Court stated in Dukes that the requirement of 
commonality147 is satisfied if the litigation presents questions that, when an-
swered, are apt to drive the resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims on a class-wide 
basis.148  In the instant case, the plaintiffs have available two distinct but re-
lated legal theories that, when decided, would drive the resolution of the liti-
gation for the entire class.149  These theories demonstrate that the class is 
cohesive enough to survive the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). 
 
 140. Id. at 780. 
 141. North Dakota law states that “‘[m]edical expenses’ means usual and custom-
ary charges incurred for reasonable and necessary medical, surgical, diagnostic, x-ray, 
dental, prosthetic, ambulance, hospital, or professional nursing services or services for 
remedial treatment and care.”  N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 26.1-41-01 (West 2013). 
 142. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 780. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (posing and 
answering the question: Why was I disfavored?). 
 146. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 780. 
 147. Before Dukes heightened the standard for commonality, commonality was 
considered to be much easier for plaintiffs to satisfy than predominance.  Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2562, 2565-66 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
Spencer, supra note 68, at 449. 
 148. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 149. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 779-80. 
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B.  Theories 
1.  The Defendant’s Legal Obligation to Pay All  
“Usual and Customary” Medical Expenses  
Necessarily Precludes Percentile-Based Reductions 
Under this theory, the plaintiffs would essentially argue that percentile-
based reductions are per se unreasonable under the contract.  The argument 
would start with the contractual language, which requires Auto-Owners to 
pay all claims for personal injuries that are “usual and customary.”  The 
plaintiffs would then argue that this language means that Auto-Owners is 
obligated to pay the full amount for all procedures of a certain type but is 
excluded from having to make any payment for other types of procedures.  
For instance, the plaintiffs could claim that the “usual and customary” lan-
guage should be construed to require Auto-Owners to pay 100% of submitted 
claims for setting broken bones and performing blood transfusions but that 
they need not pay any money on claims for plastic surgery or certain experi-
mental or other nontraditional procedures. 
This construction of the relevant language would allow the question of 
liability to be answered across the board.  Percentile-based review would be 
found to either be acceptable as to all policyholders or inappropriate as to 
everyone.  Thus, the class would follow the Dukes dictate that liability be 
determined as to all plaintiffs in the class, in one fell swoop.150  It is true that 
damages would not be uniform, and thus, their determination would require 
some individualized inquiry.  But courts have traditionally been willing to 
certify (b)(3) classes with members incurring disparate levels of damages, so 
long as questions of liability remain uniform throughout.151  Under this theo-
ry, the questions regarding which procedures would be considered “usual and 
customary” would require some individualized determinations.  However, 
these individual questions would be overwhelmed by the question of class-
wide applicability: whether the contract allows any percentile-based reduc-
tions for certain claims. 
2.  Percentile-Based Review Is Not a Per Se Breach of Contract, but 
the Eightieth Percentile Is an Unreasonably Low Point of Reduction 
Alternatively, the plaintiffs could argue that the contract permits Auto-
Owners to reduce payments based on percentile calculations but that the 
eightieth percentile is too low to capture the meaning of “usual and custom-
ary.”  Under this theory, the plaintiffs could point out that many other insur-
ance companies use percentile-based review but that they begin reducing 
 
 150. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 151. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975); Smilow v. Sw. Bell 
Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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payments at the ninetieth percentile.152  Under this theory, the plaintiffs could 
present a question capable of determining liability on a class-wide basis: 
whether the eightieth percentile is an unreasonably low point of reduction. 
This theory would also have the benefit of allowing damages to be    
calculated on a class-wide basis.  For instance, let us assume that the issue 
went to trial and that the court found that the eightieth percentile was un-
reasonable but that the ninetieth percentile was acceptable.  Under such a 
ruling, each plaintiff would be entitled to the amount equal to the eightieth 
percentile of his claim up to the ninetieth percentile of his claim, unless his 
claim fell between the eightieth and ninetieth percentile, in which case he 
could recover based on the difference between his percentile and the eightieth 
mark used by the defendant.153  With access to Auto-Owners’ percentile data 
and payment records, the parties could design a class-wide damages model 
with relative ease.154 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Wal-Mart v. Dukes Does Not Lend 
Justification to the Court’s Predominance Finding 
Throughout the Eighth Circuit’s brief and perfunctory discussion of pre-
dominance of common questions, it favorably cites the Supreme Court’s 
Dukes decision.155  However, while Dukes gives off the general air of hostili-
ty toward class actions, it fails to provide any real legal support to the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision to decertify this class.156  The court states that the question 
as to why individuals were disfavored would produce disparate answers 
 
 152. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 755; see also Appellee’s Response Brief at 29, Hal-
vorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773 (2013) (No. 12-1716) (stating that 
“other national auto insurers using the same method have at various times set their 
‘reasonableness’ cutoffs at the ninetieth, ninety-fifth, and ninety-ninth percentiles.”). 
 153. For instance, take Policyholder A and Policyholder B, both of whom submit-
ted bills for X procedure.  Auto-Owners has determined that the prices for X range 
from $0 to $100 in the relevant geographic area, and are evenly distributed.  Thus, the 
eightieth percentile would be $80.  A’s claim, at the eighty-fifth percentile, was for 
$85.  B’s claim, at the ninety-fifth percentile, was for $95. 
    Before the litigation commenced, both A and B had $80 paid toward their claims.  
Thus, A had to pay $5 and B had to pay $15.  After the court determined that the 
eightieth percentile was an unreasonably low point of review and that the ninetieth 
percentile was appropriate, both A and B are entitled to damages. 
    The calculation of these damages would be relatively simple.  A would be entitled 
to a full refund of his $5.  B, on the other hand, would only be entitled to a partial 
refund.  Since the court found that the ninetieth percentile adequately represented the 
meaning of “usual and customary” claims, B would not be entitled to any amount 
over the ninetieth percentile.  Thus, he would be eligible to receive $10 in damages.  
See Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 774-76. 
 154. See, e.g., Smilow, 323 F.3d at 40-41 (noting that the plaintiff’s expert could 
“fashion a computer program” to create a classwide damages model). 
 155. See Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 778, 780. 
 156. Compare Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2550-52, with Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 780. 
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throughout the plaintiff class.157  However, this is not necessarily the case.  A 
court could very well find that all class members were disfavored because 
they were subjected to any form of percentile-based reduction, or that they 
were subjected to an unreasonably high reduction, for the reasons given pre-
viously.158  These theories would allow a court to answer the Dukes question 
in a yes-or-no fashion on a class-wide basis. 
In reality, Dukes dealt with an entirely different scenario: one where the 
agents of the defendant company acted with discretion.  The reason the plain-
tiff class in Dukes failed the commonality requirement was that some manag-
ers discriminated based on sex while some did not.159  In the instant case, 
however, no such discretion was exercised, and the defendant had a standard 
policy of reducing payment at the eightieth percentile.160  Thus, questions 
about the efficacy of this policy, as well as why a certain plaintiff was disfa-
vored, are capable of being answered on a class-wide basis. 
D.  The Court’s Opinion Ignores Important Policy  
Considerations Underlying Rule 23(b)(3). 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision to abandon their permissive view of class 
certification as stated in Zurn Pex and adopt a much more stringent standard 
was an unfortunate policy choice that stands at odds with the intent of Rule 
23 and longstanding class action doctrine.161  Rule 23(b)(3), which contains 
notice and opt-out provisions to protect the rights of absent class members, 
was intended to present a much less onerous standard to plaintiffs at the certi-
fication stage.162  The Advisory Committee stated one of the justifications 
underlying the existence of (b)(3) classes was achieving “economies of time, 
effort, and expense,”163 and courts have traditionally understood that the pro-
vision should be given flexibility to allow for the certification of negative-
value class actions. As one court stated, “The core purpose of Rule 23(b)(3) is 
to vindicate the claims of consumers and other groups of people whose indi-
vidual claims would be too small to warrant litigation.”164 
Indeed, without the 23(b)(3) class action procedure, there would be no 
feasible means for consumers who have been defrauded to assert their sub-
stantive rights under the law; nor would there be a significant method of de-
terrence to hold large-scale miscreants accountable and prevent future mis-
 
 157. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 780. 
 158. See supra Part V.B. 
 159. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-56. 
 160. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 161. Cf. Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 779-80. 
 162. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (“[F]ramed for 
situations in which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called for’ as it is in Rule 
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where class suit 
‘may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.’”). 
 163. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes. 
 164. Smilow, 323 F.3d at 41. 
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conduct.  For most consumers who have been defrauded or scammed, the 
only economically rational way for them to protect their rights and recover 
their losses is through a class action.  For instance, the Halvorsons assert that 
they were “nickeled and dimed” out of just over $80,165 certainly not enough 
of a loss in itself to justify the legal fees required to bring an individual law-
suit.  To paraphrase Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, only a lunatic or fanatic would sue for such an amount.166  However, 
because Auto-Owners allegedly perpetrated the same scheme on many other 
consumers, the economies of scale allow consumers that join together to vin-
dicate their rights. 
When courts unduly restrict the ability of consumers to bring class ac-
tions, they essentially absolve corporations who commit petty theft on a large 
scale from any legal repercussions.  The effective outcome of restricting class 
certification is to defang consumer protection laws and immunize large-scale 
offenders from having to answer for their misconduct.  This runs in clear 
contrast to the policy goals of Rule 23.167 
The Eighth Circuit appears to be following the general trend set by the 
Supreme Court in recent years: dismantling the class action procedural de-
vice.  Though the Eighth Circuit is compelled to follow the specific legal 
principles outlined by the Supreme Court, it is not required to view all class 
action issues through the lens of disdain adopted by the Supreme Court ma-
jority.168  By gratuitously extending the holdings of Wal-Mart v. Dukes and 
Comcast v. Behrend beyond the point required, the court did a disservice to 
consumers and to class action doctrine. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Court’s ruling in Halvorson indicates that the Eighth Circuit is 
ready to put serious restraints on the use of consumer class actions.  The rul-
ing marks a noteworthy step away from the decision in Zurn Pex, which indi-
cated a preference for permissive class certification standards.169  Though the 
court’s finding on the standing issue is not especially onerous, its ruling on 
the issue of predominance of common questions is far more troubling.  Most 
likely, it is indicative of a future trend to further restrict the use of 23(b)(3) 
class actions.170  Hopefully, the Eighth Circuit will rethink the problematic 
 
 165. MEALEY’S, supra note 5, at ¶ 7. 
 166. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The 
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero indi-
vidual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
 167. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 616-17. 
 168. See Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 780 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(extending the principles outlined in Dukes). 
 169. See supra Part III.C. 
 170. See, e.g., Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 780. 
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consequences of taking such a path and limit this ruling so that consumers 
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